

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OTTAWA 00067 01 OF 03 100356Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-07 AGRE-00 AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01
CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 COME-00 DLOS-06 DODE-00 DOTE-00
EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 TRSE-00 H-01 INR-07
INT-05 IO-13 JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 NSF-01
OES-06 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAL-01
FEA-01 USIE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /115 W
-----100425Z 119435 /66

O 100230Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2075

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 OTTAWA 0067

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SENV, PBOR, EFIS, CA
SUBJECT: GULF OF MAINE

REF: A. OTTAWA 0056, B. STATE 4237

1. SUMMARY: EXTAFF MINISTER JAMIESON BACKS UP HIS
SUBORDINATES IN RESERVING CANADIAN RIGHT TO ARGUE FOR A
BOUNDARY SOUTH OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE. BUT HE IS WILLING TO
ABANDON CANADIAN INSISTANCE ON JOINT MANAGEMENT AND JOINT
SURVEILLANCE IN A SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT, AND TO COMMIT TO THIRD
PARTY SETTLEMENT IF THE BOUNDARY IS NOT AGREED BY 31 DECEMBER
1977. MESSAGE PROPOSES THAT WE TRY TO NAIL DOWN JAMIESON CONCESSIONS
WHILE HANGING TOUGH ON RECOGNITION OF US JURISDICTION SOUTH OF
THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE JANUARY 17
NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH JAMIESON JANUARY 09. EXTAFF
UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON, LEGAL ADVISER COPITHORNE, FISH
NEGOTIATOR LEGAULT ALSO PRESENT.

3. LED OFF WITH REVIEW OF OCTOBER 15 KISSINGER/JAMIESON
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OTTAWA 00067 01 OF 03 100356Z

MEETING IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE REPORTED IN OTTAWA 0056.
STRESSED THAT WE HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT CANADIANS HAD AGREED NOT TO
EXCLUDE A BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TWO CLAIMED LINES, AND QUOTED
JAMIESON'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 22 (SECSTATE 275630) AS CORROBORATION.
IN RETURN, KISSINGER HAD AGREED NOT TO EXCLUDE JOINT ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR FISHERIES. HOWEVER HE HAD NOT EMBRACED THE CONCEPT OF
"JOINT MANAGEMENT".

4. JAMIESON REPLIED THAT OUR INTERPRETATION WAS CORRECT. HOWEVER, HE HAD INTENDED THAT THE STATEMENT ON NOT EXCLUDING A COMPROMISE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE TWO CLAIMED LINES TO BE "WITHOUT PREJUDICE". THAT IS TO SAY, IT WOULD NOT STOP CANADA FROM ADVANCING SOME OTHER LINE, INCLUDING ONE OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE OF OVERLAPPING CLAIMS. JAMIESON ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT RPT NOT CANADA'S INTENTION TO CLAIM SUCH A LINE, PROVIDED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PERMANENT REGIME CONCLUDED SUCCESSFULLY. THIS INTERPREATION OF THE MEETING, COPITHORNE REMARKED, WAS SUPPORTED BY THE CANADIAN ORDER-IN-COUNCIL WHICH NOTED THAT THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE ADVANCED BY CANADA WOULD NOT PREJUDICE ANY OTHER CLAIMS ALREADY ADVANCED OR TO BE ADVANCED IN THE FUTURE.

5. REGARDING JOINT MANAGEMENT, JAMIESON SAID THAT HIS INTENTION WAS ONLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME ORDERLY, SCIENTIFICALLY-BASED EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE STOCKS THAT SHOULD BE FISHED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER AND THAT THAT WOULD BE GIVEN EFFECT THROUGH THE AGREEMENT. WITH SUCH ARRANGEMENTS, "THE BORDER BECOMES MUCH LESS IMPORTANT, AND A BORDER BETWEEN THE CLAIM LINES COULD BE ENVISAGED". (COMMENT: JAMIESON THUS FULLY BACKED UP THE EFFORTS OF CANADIAN BUREAUCRATS OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS TO UNDO A KEY ASPECT OF THE KISSINGER/JAMIESON MEETING, AGREEMENT THAT THE CANADIANS WOULD NOT CLAIM A LINE SOUTH OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE.)

6. ON REFELCTION, JAMIESON SAID, IT APPEARED THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 OTTAWA 00067 01 OF 03 100356Z

"JOINT MANAGEMENT" IS MORE RELEVANT TO A LONG-TERM AGREE-
MENT THAN TO A SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT, PROVIDED THAT THE
SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT ESSENTIALLY CONTINUED THE STATUS
QUO OR WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS. IF BOTH SIDES WERE
TO NEGOTIATE FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT, JAMIESON DID NOT
THINK IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INSIST ON JOINT MANAGEMENT.
LEGAULT CONFIRMED THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE NOT TOO FAR
APART ON NUMBERS AND PROBABLY COULD AGREE.

7. THE MOST URGENT TASK, JAMIESON SAID, WAS SHORT-TERM FISHERIES.
CANADA RECOGNIZED THAT THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN INTERIM REGIME
MIGHT BECOME PERMANENT WAS ONE THAT CONCERNED THE UNITED STATES,
AND WAS THEREFORE QUITE PREPARED TO SET A TIME LIMIT TO THE
SHORT-TERM ARRANGEMENT. ONCE THE SHORT-TERM ARRANGEMENT WAS OUT OF
THE WAY, AND JAMIESON REMARKED THAT THE U.S. NOTE FROM SECSTATE
004237 WAS VERY HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD, THE WAY WOULD THEN BE
OPEN TO DEAL WITH A PERMANENT REGIME. IT MIGHT BE TOO EARLY
TO CHARACTERIZE THE PERMANENT REGIME, BUT THREE ELEMENTS SHOULD
BE ADDRESSED IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING TOWARDS IT: BOUNDARY,

LONG-TERM FISHERIES ARRANGEMENTS, AND LONG-TERM HYDROCARBONS
ARRANGEMENTS. JAMIESON WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ADD A FOURTH ITEM.
MARINE POLLUTION.

8. I ASKED WHAT IF BY 31 DECEMBER 1977, THE NEGOTIATORS
HAD BEEN UNABLE TO AGREE ON A PERMANENT REGIME?

9. JAMIESON SAID THAT THERE WOULD THEN BE NO ALTERNATIVE
BUT TO GO TO THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT, EVEN THOUGH THAT WOULD BE
COSTLY IN POLITICAL TERMS FOR CANADA SINCE IT WOULD BE A CONFESSION
THAT ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT WORKING WELL
ENOUGH TO HANDLE A MAJOR BILATERAL ISSUE.

10. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, JAMIESON AGREED TO THE
FOLLOWING FORMULATION, WHICH I UNDERTOOK TO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OTTAWA 00067 02 OF 03 100409Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-07 AGRE-00 AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01
CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 COME-00 DLOS-06 DODE-00 DOTE-00
EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 TRSE-00 H-01 INR-07
INT-05 IO-13 JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 NSF-01
OES-06 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAL-01
FEA-01 USIE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /115 W
-----100425Z 119469 /66

O 100230Z JAN 77

FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2076

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 OTTAWA 0067

SUBMIT TO WASHINGTON FOR CONFIRMATION:

A. URGENT CONCLUSION OF A SHORT-TERM FISHERIES AGREEMENT, TO
EXPIRE ON 31 DECEMBER 1977. NO EXTENSION WOULD BE ENVISAGED.
AGREEMENT WOULD BE BASED ON STATUS QUO, MODIFIED AS
NEEDED BY BOTH SIDES, WITHOUT REPEAT WITHOUT JOINT
MANAGEMENT OR JOINT SURVEILLANCE;

B. NEGOTIATION DURING 1977 OF A LONG-TERM REGIME FOR THE
GULF OF MAINE, AND RESOLUTION OF THE OTHER BOUNDARY ISSUES.
DURING THE GULF OF MAINE NEGOTIATIONS, FOUR ELEMENTS WOULD BE
ADDRESSED: BOUNDARY, LONG-TERM FISHERIES ARRANGEMENTS, LONG-
TERM HYDROCARBONS ARRANGEMENTS, AND MARINE POLLUTION. BUT

THERE WOULD BE AT THIS STAGE NO EFFORT AS OF NOW TO CHARACTERIZE THE FINAL RESULT NOR DESCRIBE THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS.

C. IF AGREEMENT ON THE GULF OF MAINE BOUNDARY WERE NOT REACHED BY 31 DECEMBER 1977, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES NOW TO SEEK THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THE BODY TO WHICH REFERENCE WOULD BE MAKE WOULD NOT BE DETERMINED IN ADVANCE.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OTTAWA 00067 02 OF 03 100409Z

11. ON TIMING, I SAID THAT LONG TERM FISHERIES DISCUSSIONS WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE NEGOTIATORS HAD WORKED THEIR WAY THROUGH ITS SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT. BUT BOUNDARY AND HYDROCARBONS COULD AND SHOULD START NOW. LEGAULT SAID YES, CAPITHORNE SAID NO, AND JAMIESON RESERVED (COMMENT: I THINK THERE IS GIVE ON THIS).

12. I THEN ASKED JAMIESON WHETHER HE HAD ANY DIFFICULTY WITH THE CONCEPTS PUT FORWARD IN THE NOTE ON SHORT-TERM FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS (SECSTATE 004237).

13. LEGAULT REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE DIFFICULTIES OF DEFINING INDIVIDUAL NUMBERS, BUT THESE SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE. HOWEVER, U.S. INSISTENCE THAT THE SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT RECOGNIZE U.S. JURISDICTION SOUTH OF THE EQUI-DISTANCE LINE IN THE GULF OF MAINE AREA WOULD BE A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK. CANADA IS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO A SHORTTERM AGREEMENT WHICH DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE TERRITORIAL CLAIM OF EITHER SIDE. IF, HOWEVER, CANADA WERE TO RECOGNIZE U.S. JURISDICTION SOUTH OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE IN THE SHORT-TERM FISHEREIS AGREEMENT, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES, SHOULD THE ISSUE GO TO THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT, TO ARGUE THAT SPECIAL FACTORS WOULD ENABLE CANADA TO CLAIM A LINE SOUTH OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE. THE ISSUE WAS ALSO IMPORTANT, LEGAULT CONTINUES, IN THE JUAN DE FUCA STRAIT QUESTION. THERE APPLICATION OF SPECIAL FACTORS WOULD ENABLE CANADA TO CLAIM A LINE SOUTH OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE, AS HAS BEEN SET FORTH IN THE CANADIAN EMBASSY NOTE NO. 626, DATED 22 DECEMBER 1976.

14. JAMIESON INTERJECTED THAT CANADA DID NOT AS OF NOW INTEND TO CLAIM SUCH A LINE, AND INDEED MIGHT NOT AT ANY POINT. HOWEVER, CANADA DOES NOT SEE WHY IT SHOULD GIVE AWAY THE POSSIBILITY OF ARGUING FOR A LINE SOUTH OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE REPRESENTS, IF THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF GOING TO THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 OTTAWA 00067 02 OF 03 100409Z

15. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT SURE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO CONCLUDE SUCH AN AGREEMENT THAT DID NOT RECOGNIZE U.S. JURISDICTION SOUTH OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE, ABSENT ADDITIONAL ACTION BY THE CONGRESS. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. NOTE OF DECEMBER 30 (SECSTATE 313675) ADDRESSED A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT QUESTION (THAT OF FORBEARANCE) IT WOULD APPEAR FROM ITS TERMS THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT WELL NOT HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO CONCLUDE SUCH AN AGREEMENT. I SAID I WOULD ASK INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON ON THE QUESTION. IN ANY CASE, I TOLD JAMIESON THAT THE IDEA OF OPENING UP AGAIN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE (OR NORTH OF OUR OWN CLAIM) WOULD BE GREETED WITH DISMAY IN WASHINGTON AS A SERIOUS REGRESSION FROM THE OCTOBER 15 MEETING. INSTEAD OF GRADUALLY NARROWING THE AREA OF DISPUTE, CANADA WAS NOW ENLARGING IT.

16. I THEN ASKED JAMIESON TO SPECULATE ON THE CONSEQUENCES SHOULD IT PROVE FOR LEGAL OR POLICY REASONS IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE ON INTERIM FISHERIES ARRANGEMENTS. JAMIESON REPLIED THAT HE ASSUMED THE WORST CASE (THAT OF US AND CANADIAN ENFORCEMENT SHIPS TELLING THE FISHING BOATS OF THE OTHER COUNTRY TO GET OFF THEIR CLAIMED TERRITORY) WOULD NOT OCCUR. I TOLD HIM I WOULD ASSUME THAT ALSO, BUT WE MIGHT HAVE A SITUATION IN WHICH EACH COUNTRY UNILATERALLY SET DOWN TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR ACCESS BY FISHERMEN OF THE OTHER COUNTRY TO THE AREA NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE ZONE OF OVERLAPPING CLAIMS. IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NEW REGIONAL FISHERIES COUNCIL WOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ANY SUCH UNILATERAL DETERMINATION. SINCE THE AMERICAN FISHERIES INTERESTS IN THE GULF OF MAINE WERE CONVINCED THAT THEY WERE LESS COMPETITIVE THAN THEIR CANADIAN COUNTERPARTS, AND LIKELY TO GO MORE SO WITH TIME, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THEY WOULD ADOPT A HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE POLICY. CANADIANS MIGHT FIND THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 OTTAWA 00067 02 OF 03 100409Z

THE UNILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS BECAME LESS GENEROUS. THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE THE CASE IF THERE WERE INCIDENTS. AMERICANS WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO EXPECT A PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT ON THE CANADIAN SIDE. THUS, ABSENT AGREEMENT, THERE WAS A DANGER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OTTAWA 00067 03 OF 03 100418Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-07 AGRE-00 AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01
CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 COME-00 DLOS-06 DODE-00 DOTE-00
EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 TRSE-00 H-01 INR-07
INT-05 IO-13 JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 NSF-01
OES-06 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAL-01
FEA-01 USIE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /115 W
-----100424Z 119538 /66

O 100230Z JAN 77

FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2077

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 OTTAWA 0067

THAT THE PRIMARY CANADIAN OBJECTIVE (TO CONTINUE ITS
HISTORIC ROLE ON GEORGES BANK) MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE OF ATTAINMENT.
JAMIESON SAID HE SAW THAT BUT HOPED VERY SINCERELY THAT THAT
WOULD NOT BE THE CASE.

17. DISCUSSION CONTINUED ON THE ISSUE OF U.S.
JURISDICTION SOUTH OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE AND THE SHORT-TERM
FISHERIES ARRANGEMENT FOR ALMOST AN HOUR, BUT WITH NO OTHER
SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS BEING INTRODUCED. I THEN SAID I WOULD
SEEK INSTRUCTION WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD INSIST ON RECOGNITION SOUTH
OF THE EQUIDISTNACE LINE IN THE INTERIM FISHERIES ARRANGEMENT.
IF IT DOES, AND IF CANADA DOES NOT ALTER ITS POSITION, I REMARKED
THAT THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE SOME QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE JANUARY
17 MEETING SHOULD GO AHEAD. JAMIESON FELT IT SHOULD, HOWEVER,
SINCE "EVEN IF WE CAN'T AGREE ON THE JURISDICTION ISSUE, IT
WOULD BE GOOD TO HAVE THE NUMBERS AGREED FOR FUTURE REFERENCE".
JAMIESON ADDED THAT ONCE THE NUMBERS WERE AGREED, IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY TO THE PUBLIC HOLDING UP AGREEMENT "ON
A LEGAL TECHNICALITY".

18. ASKED ABOUT THE GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES AGREEMENT
ENVISAGED IN THE U.S. NOTE (SECSTATE 004237, PARA 5), SHOULD
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OTTAWA 00067 03 OF 03 100418Z

PREFERRED POSITION ON A SHORT-TERM FISHERIES AGREEMENT NOT BE
ACCEPTABLE, JAMIESON SAID THAT CANADA COULD NOT ACCTPT IT.

A. GIFA WOULD IN FACT CONSTITUTE RECOGNITION OF U.S.

JURISDICTION, AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT RESOLVE THE KEY ISSUE
DIVIDING THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

19. COMMENT: NOTHING IN HIS CONVERSATION OR IN JAMIESON'S MANNER
PERMITS ME TO BE OPTIMISTIC THAT CANADA WILL SOON ABANDON ITS
EFFORT TO RESERVE A CLAIM OR AT LEAST AN ARGUMENT FOR A LINE SOUTH
OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE.

20. ACTION REQUESTED. SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD INDICATE OUR
AGREEMENT TO THE POINTS CONTAINED IN PARA 10 ABOVE IN AN AIDE
MEMOIRE THAT I COULD LEAVE WITH ROBINSON IN JAMIESON'S
ABSENCE. RE OMISSION OF JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND JOINT MANAGEMENT
FROM THE SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT, I SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY TO REACH
ORAL AGREEMENT.

21. IF THE U.S. DOES NOT HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A
SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT WHICH DOES NOT EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZE
U.S. JURISDICTION, IT SHOULD SO STATE.

22. IF THE U.S. DOES HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENTER AN AGREEMENT
WHICH DOES NOT EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZE U.S. JURISDICTION, AIDE-
MEMOIRE SHOULD SIMPLY NOTE CANADIAN POSITION AND REITERATE OURS.
THAT WOULD LEAVE TO AFTER THE JANUARY 17 NEGOTIATIONS DECISION
WHETHER OR NOT TO MODIFY OUR POSITION.
ENDERS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS, FISHING AGREEMENTS, MEETING REPORTS, FISHING GROUNDS, BOUNDARIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 10-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977OTTAWA00067
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770008-0575
Format: TEL
From: OTTAWA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770166/aaaacgbr.tel
Line Count: 357
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 18f2b6db-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 OTTAWA 56, 77 STATE 4237
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3632789
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: GULF OF MAINE
TAGS: SENV, PBOR, EFIS, CA, (ENDERS, THOMAS O), (JAMIESON, DONALD)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/18f2b6db-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009